

REMARKS

Claims 22-36 are pending.

The Examiner has rejected claims 22-36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over King and Estrada.

The Examiner has failed to address many of the limitations of the claims in his rejection. For example, claim 22 recites "providing existing specs for media elements." The Examiner does not explain what in King corresponds to such providing. Moreover, the Examiner has not even stated what he believes in King corresponds to applicant's "media element." King does not use the term "media element." It is the Examiner's responsibility to explain what he believes corresponds to applicant's "media element." The Examiner has not done so.

In addition, it is unclear what the Examiner believes corresponds to applicant's "specs" of media elements. King uses the terms "output media specifications," "change type specifications," "media specification," "presentation specifications," "HTML specifications," "published specifications," "user specification," and simply "specification." Applicant requests clarification as to which of these corresponds to applicant's "specs."

It is the Examiner's position that "King discloses a method in which media elements have existing specs which are displayed to web writers so they can locate a desired media (column 5, line 55-column, line 36 of King)." (Office Action, Apr. 1, 2005, p. 2.) Presumably, the Examiner's position is intended to show that King discloses the "displaying to a writer the existing specs for the media elements so that the writer can locate a desired media element" as recited, for example, in claim 22. The cited section of King, however, describes a technique that "automatically performs document layout, styling and fit of specified content elements into a selected design." Applicant can find nothing in this cited section that describes displaying of existing specs so that a writer can locate a desired media element. To the contrary, the technology of the cited section

describes "automatic and dynamic composition and recomposition of program objects including design descriptions, content element, and output media specifications." King clearly describes an automated process in which the "output media specifications" are automatically and dynamically composed. There is nothing in the cited section to suggest that the specs for media elements are displayed to web writers as recited by the claims.

Claim 22 recites "storing the created spec in association with the web page." The Examiner points to Estrada at 4:5-40 and 21:35-22:65 as showing "that the user may create a spec for the desired element which is associated with the web page." Estrada mentions "specification" at 4:24 as the Examiner points out in the Advisory Action of September 15, 2005. That section, however, only mentions that a graphics artist generates a graphics file in response "to a specification provided by a requester." This section does not mention that a specification is stored in association with a web page. Clearly, the Examiner must be relying on 21:35-22:65 as showing that a specification is stored in association with a web page. Since this section, however, does not even mention "specification," applicant is puzzled as to what the Examiner believes in 21:35-22:65 describes the storing of the specification as defined by 4:24 in association with a web page.

Claim 22 also recites "inserting a unique identifier for the created media element into the web page." The Examiner cites King at 11:1-12:62 as showing this inserting. Applicant can find nothing in that section that teaches or suggests such inserting of a unique identifier. Moreover, applicant cannot even find any reference to a unique identifier.

Because the Examiner has failed to establish even a prima facie basis for obviousness of claim 22, applicant respectfully requests that the rejection be withdrawn. Moreover, since all the pending claims have a language similar to the language of claim 22 as discussed above, the rejection of all the claims should be withdrawn.

Based upon these remarks, applicant respectfully requests reconsideration of this application and its early allowance. If the Examiner has any questions or believes a telephone conference would expedite prosecution of this application, the Examiner is encouraged to call the undersigned at (206) 359-8548.

Dated: 9/30/05

Respectfully submitted,

By Maurice J. Pirio
Maurice J. Pirio

Registration No.: 33,273
PERKINS COIE LLP
P.O. Box 1247
Seattle, Washington 98111-1247
(206) 359-8548
(206) 359-7198 (Fax)
Attorney for Applicant